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Affirmed or Delegated?
Finding Inherent Tribal Civil Power to Issue and
Enforce Protection Orders Against All Persons
in Light of Spurr v. Pope
Kelly Gaines Stoner1 and Lauren van Schilfgaarde2
ABSTRACT
Federal courts have wreaked havoc on tribal jurisdiction by
injecting incertitude over their most basic authority, including the
authority to issue and enforce civil protection orders. This
jurisdictional incertitude causes not just legal disruption, but also
further compromises the safety of Native people who are
disproportionately victimized, especially by gender-based forms of
violence. While Congress has been slow to remedy the onslaught of
judicial limitations on tribal jurisdiction, Congress has at least
remedied tribal authority to issue and enforce protection orders in 18
U.S.C. § 2265(e). However, even in this remedy, jurisdictional
incertitude remains.
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Kelly Stoner served as a Judge for the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma for eight
years. As of October 2013, Ms. Stoner is a Victim Advocacy Legal Specialist for the
Tribal Law and Policy Institute. For over twenty years, she taught at the North
Dakota School of Law and Oklahoma City University School of Law where she was
an Instructor teaching Tribal Law and Domestic Violence classes and supervising
tribal clinical programs. In 2008, Ms. Stoner testified before the U.S. Indian Affairs
Committee regarding domestic violence issues affecting Native American women in
Indian country. In 2010, she was invited to the White House to witness the signing
of the Tribal Law and Order Act. She is a frequent lecturer for the American Bar
Association’s Commission on Domestic Violence and for the Office on Violence
Against Women’s national technical assistance providers on domestic violence
issues in Indian country. Ms. Stoner is a graduate of the University of Oklahoma
College of Law.
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Lauren van Schilfgaarde (Cochiti Pueblo) is the San Manuel Band of Mission
Indians Director for the Tribal Legal Development Clinic at the UCLA School of
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previously served as the Tribal Law and Policy Institute’s
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the American Bar Association’s Native American Concerns Committee, as a
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Rights, and as a Board Member of the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation Child Wellbeing Program. Professor van Schilfgaarde graduated from the UCLA School of Law
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Through its plenary power, Congress has the authority to
remedy tribal jurisdiction by either affirming inherent tribal power, or
by delegating new federal powers to tribes. The precise nature of the
Congressional action – affirming or delegating -- determines the
source of power a tribe exercises., The source of a tribe’s power affects
in turn the ways in which a tribe may exercise that power—in this case,
the power to issue or enforce a protection order. Native victims bear
the consequences of this decision.
This Article examines how implicit divestiture led to the need
for Congressional reassurance that tribes possess the authority to
issue and enforce protection orders over all persons. This Article then
examines the potential consequences of whether that reassurance is an
affirmation of inherent tribal powers, or instead a delegation of federal
powers. Finally, this Article analyzes, the plain language and
legislative intent behind 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e)—as well as overarching
federal and international policies—to determine whether this
reassurance of tribal civil power is an affirmation or a delegation.
INTRODUCTION
There is a troubling cloud of judicial doubt threatening tribes’
ability to issue and enforce protection orders. Such incertitude
regarding inherent tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians poses a
dangerous barrier to the effective administration of justice in Indian
country. This is concerning, as Indian country has a public safety
crisis.3 A Bureau of Justice Statistics report estimates the rate of
American Indian/Alaska Native (“AI/AN”)4 violent crime to be well
3

INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMMISSION, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA
SAFER 3 (Nov. 2013), https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_
Making_Native_America_Safer-Full.pdf (“An exceedingly complicated web of
jurisdictional rules, asserted by Federal and State governmental departments and
agencies whose policy priorities usually pre-date the modern era of Tribal
sovereignty and self-determination, contributes to what has become an
institutionalized public safety crisis.”).
4
A note on terminology: this article uses “Indigenous,” “American Indian and
Alaska Native,” “Indian,” and “Native” to refer to the original inhabitants of what is
now the United States of America. We use these terms interchangeably, seeking to
be inclusive and respectful of the Peoples and tribes that represent them. Indigenous
peoples comprise hundreds of tribes, including the 574 presently federally
recognized tribes, and the hundreds more that are unrecognized. Indigeneity is both
a political and a racial status, with overlapping and distinct legal meanings, including
in regards to tribal authority to respond to violence. This article specifically concerns
the authority of federally recognized tribes. However, we would like to acknowledge
all Indigenous peoples. We also would like to honor the space on which this article
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above that of any other U.S. racial or ethnic group and more than twice
the national average.5 Native women are particularly at risk. AI/AN
women are victimized at rates higher than any other race.6 They are
much more likely to be battered, raped, and stalked.7 Four out of five
AI/AN women have experienced violence in their lifetime.8
Tribal protection orders9 are critical tools to keep tribal
residents safe from violence, especially gender-based forms of
violence. Tribal nations have always been and continue to be
committed to securing public safety in Indian country.10 Yet, the
demographics and needs of tribes are dynamic: tribal communities
was drafted, including both the traditional lands of the Gabrielino Tongva and
Fernandeño Tataviam in California, and the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes in
Oklahoma.
5
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN INDIANS AND
CRIME, A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002, at iii (Dec. 2004), https://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf. Unfortunately, the BJS has yet to release an
updated report.
6
Adverse Health Conditions and Health Risk Behaviors Associated with Intimate
Partner Violence, United States- 2005, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, 57(05) MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, Feb. 6, 2008,
at 113-117.
7
NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND
ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN RESEARCH POLICY UPDATE 1 (Feb. 2018), https://www.
ncai.org/policy-issues/tribal-governance/public-safety-and-justice/violence-againstwomen/VAWA_Data_Brief__FINAL_2_1_2018.pdf.
8
Id.
9
See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(5) (“The term “protection order” includes— (A) any
injunction, restraining order, or any other order issued by a civil or criminal court for
the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against, sexual
violence, or contact or communication with or physical proximity to, another person,
including any temporary or final order issued by a civil or criminal court whether
obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente lite order in another
proceeding so long as any civil or criminal order was issued in response to a
complaint, petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of a person seeking protection;
and (B) any support, child custody or visitation provisions, orders, remedies or relief
issued as part of a protection order, restraining order, or injunction pursuant to State,
tribal, territorial, or local law authorizing the issuance of protection orders,
restraining orders, or injunctions for the protection of victims of domestic violence,
sexual assault, dating violence, or stalking.”).
10
See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (“Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of
this title, the term ‘Indian country’, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c)
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same.”).
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may be comprised of Indian members of the tribe,11 Indians who are
members of other tribes, and non-Indians who may be residing,
visiting, or working within a tribe’s Indian country.12 A
comprehensive public safety strategy requires the exercise of
jurisdiction over all persons.
The importance of a tribe’s jurisdiction to issue and enforce
protection orders—specifically over non-Indians—cannot be
overstated: fifty-six percent of AI/AN women have experienced sexual
violence, of which 90 percent were by interracial perpetrators; 55.5
percent of AI/AN women have experienced physical violence by an
intimate partner,13 of which 90 percent were by interracial
perpetrators; and 48.8 percent of AI/AN women have been stalked, of
which 89 percent were by interracial perpetrators.14 In at least 86
percent of reported cases of rape or sexual assault against AI/AN
women, survivors report that the batterers are non-Indian men.15 These
studies underscore the long-standing reality of interracial violence for
Native persons. The jurisdictional complexities in Indian country,
including the limitations on tribal authority to respond, exacerbate this
interracial violence.16
Congress has acknowledged the critical importance of tribal
protection orders—including the need for tribes to exert civil
jurisdiction to issue and enforce protection orders over all persons—
11
For purposes of this article, the authority of a tribe’s civil powers will be examined
solely for federally recognized tribes. The 1994 Federally Recognized Indian Tribe
List Act provides “the list of federally recognized Indian tribes in the United States
which are eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United State
to Indians because of their status as Indians.” Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List
Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-454, Title I, § 103, 108 Stat. 4791 (Nov. 2, 1994) (codified
as 25 U.S.C. § 5130). There are currently 574 federally recognized tribes. The Indian
Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq. defines an Indian as any person who
would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1153. But, tribal sovereignty and tribal existence are not dependent on federal
recognition. Rather, tribal sovereignty is rooted inherently within the tribe.
12
See, e.g., McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2479 (2020) (“But neither is it
unheard of for significant non-Indian populations to live successfully in or near
reservations today.”).
13
André B. Rosay, Violence Against American Indian and Alaska Native Women
and Men, 277 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 38-45 (2016).
14
Id.
15
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE USA 4 (2007),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR510592007ENGLISH.PDF.
16
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, VAWA’S 2013 SPECIAL DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR REPORT 3 (2013),
https://www.ncai.org/resources/ncai-publications/SDVCJ_5_Year_Report.pdf.
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by verifying that tribal authority in 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e). But the source
and extent of tribal authority in that statute remain unclear. Section
2265(e) does not explicitly identify whether the source of tribal
authority is inherent and merely affirmed by Congress, or if it is a
delegation of federal authority to the tribes. Previous verifications of
tribal authority have gone both ways.
In Spurr v. Pope, the Sixth Circuit upheld § 2265(e)’s
verification of tribal authority to issue civil protection orders, but
suggested in a footnote that § 2265(e) was a delegation of federal
authority.17 The ramifications of whether tribal authority is affirmed
versus delegated are vast: they implicate whether federal-tribal double
jeopardy, federal notions of constitutional due process and equal
protection, and accompanying federal case law become applicable to
tribes in civil protection order cases.18
To analyze whether § 2265(e) is an affirmation of inherent
tribal authority or a delegation of federal authority to a tribe, this article
reviews the plain language of the statute, legislative intent, and
overarching federal and international policy against the backdrop of
the Indian law canons of construction.19 In addition to this legal
analysis, this article explores the legal and historical position of tribes
as sovereigns and the possible ramifications of affirmed tribal
authority versus delegated federal authority. Ultimately, the textual,
policy, and historical context behind the verification of tribal authority
within § 2265(e) consistently upholds a finding that it is affirmed
inherent tribal power. This bodes well for tribal sovereignty, as well as
the victims seeking tribal protection.
I.

Implicit Divestiture and the Need for a Martinez-Fix

A. The Growing Trend of Implicitly Divesting Inherent Tribal
Powers
Since time immemorial, tribes have exercised civil and
criminal jurisdiction over all persons. Like all governments, tribes
17

936 F.3d 478, 486 n.2 (6th Cir. 2019) (“This express delegation of authority to the
tribes obviates the need to meet one of the two Montana exceptions.”).
18
While Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs, that plenary power does
not impact the source of tribal laws, which are inherent and separate from the United
States. Because tribal sovereignty existed prior to the formation of the Constitution,
tribes are not bound by its provisions and the attendant federal case law interpreting
those provisions. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to the Cherokee Nation’s Tribal Court).
19
See infra Section VI.A.
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have a duty to protect all those within their lands. Increasingly, this
includes nonmembers present in Indian country.20 Beginning in the
latter half of the twentieth century and continuing into the twenty-first,
U.S. courts have created implicit cracks in tribal powers over nonIndians. The “implicit divestiture” doctrine was first introduced in
1978 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indians.21
Oliphant held that all tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
because such an exercise of authority—though not explicitly
acknowledged by Congress or treaty—was suddenly “‘inconsistent
with [the tribes’] status.’”22 The doctrine was extended to the exercise
of tribal civil jurisdiction in Montana v. United States,23 impacting the
tribes’ ability to issue protection orders against nonmembers, as well
as an array of tribal governmental powers. In Montana, the Supreme
Court held that tribes lacked regulatory authority over nonmembers on
non-Indian owned fee land within the reservation subject to two
exceptions: (1) the tribes may exercise jurisdiction over “nonmembers
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,” or
(2) when the nonmember’s “conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe.”24 The Supreme Court in Strate v. A-1 Contractors
then extended Montana to a tribe’s civil adjudicatory authority.25
20

See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Lives Matter: Pandemics and
Inherent Tribal Powers, 73 STANFORD L. REV. 38 (2020). Note: the term
“nonmember” has been used to refer to both nonmember Indians and non-Indians.
Supreme Court case law has often conflated these terms, exacerbating the complexity
of tribal jurisdiction.
21
435 U.S. 191, 203 (1978) (basing the Court’s finding of an erosion of tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in the federal “unspoken assumption” that
tribes lacked such jurisdiction historically); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.02[3][b] (Nell Jessup Newton, et. al., eds., 2012), at 228
[hereinafter “COHEN’S HANDBOOK”] (footnote omitted) (“In positing the existence
of a historical assumption, shared by all three branches of the federal government,
that Indian tribes lack authority to try and to punish non-Indians, the [Oliphant] Court
relied on selected treaty language, opinions of attorneys general issued in 1834 and
1856, defeated congressional bills and accompanying legislative reports, dictum
from an 1878 opinion by a district court judge, and a withdrawn 1970 opinion of the
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior.”).
22
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th
Cir. 1976)).
23
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
24
Id. at 565-66. Note, the Court uses “non-Indian” and “nonmember”
interchangeably. While there are significant jurisdictional ramifications to extending
restrictions on tribal civil authority over nonmember Indians, Montana analysis
indisputably extends to non-Indians.
25
520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997). Strate held that a tribe could not exercise civil
jurisdiction over a tort suit between nonmembers arising from an accident on a state
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Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have narrowed these
Montana exceptions considerably.26 Determining whether tribal
authority satisfies one of these two exceptions, and therefore exists
over nonmembers on fee land in Indian country, is now known as
conducting a “Montana analysis.”27 A Montana analysis would be
necessary to establish tribal civil subject matter jurisdiction any time a
protection order action involves a nonmember petitioner or
respondent.
The implicit divestiture doctrine was recently examined in
Dollar General, in which the U.S. Supreme Court tied 4 to 4 to
effectively affirm the Fifth Circuit’s decision to uphold tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction over a tort claim for an alleged sexual assault
of a minor tribal member.28 The U.S. Supreme Court similarly upheld
the inherent authority of tribes pertaining to tribal police office
authority to temporarily detain and search non-Indian persons
traveling on public rights-of-way running through a reservation.29 In
U.S. v. Cooley, the Court unanimously found inherent tribal police
power under the second Montana exception.30 The Court noted that the
second Montana exception recognizes inherent tribal power to protect
the health or welfare of the tribe, including from ongoing threats.31
However, these narrow tribal victories are part of a longstanding debate over whether the United States ought to “trust tribes”

highway within a reservation, opining that neither Montana exception was satisfied.
Id.
26
See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 657 n.12 (2001) (citation
omitted) (first alteration in original) (narrowing the second Montana exception to
mean “unless the drain of the nonmember’s conduct upon tribal services and tribal
resources is so severe that it actually ‘imperil[s]’ the political integrity of the Indian
tribe, there can be no assertion of [tribal] civil authority beyond tribal lands”); Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 340 (2008)
(holding that a tribe lacks adjudicatory authority over a civil claim brought by a tribal
member against a nonmember owned bank involving fee land on a reservation). But
see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S 353, 371 (2001) (noting that the claim concerned “a
very narrow category of outsiders,” i.e., state law enforcement officers, the Court
denied tribal civil jurisdiction in a tort claim brought by a tribal member asserting
damages committed on trust land by state law enforcement officers searching the
tribal member’s own land for evidence of an alleged off-reservation crime).
27
See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S at 370 (referring to “the Montana analysis”).
28
Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 746 F. 3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).
29
U.S. v. Cooley, No. 19-1414, 593 U.S. ___ (2021).
30
Id. at slip op. at 4.
31
Id.
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to exercise governance powers.32 While the doctrine of implicit
divestiture maintains that tribal sovereignty has deteriorated through a
combination of colonization and time, challenges to tribal jurisdiction
over nonmembers frequently rest on the “foreignness” of tribes. Many
courts believe that tribal jurisdiction is “sovereignty outside the basic
structure of the Constitution”33 and that tribal laws are unknowable and
obscure.34 Justice Breyer noted in Cooley that tribal police authority to
search and detain non-Indians is palatable in part because Cooley was
only being transferred to a state or federal jurisdiction and would not
be subject to tribal laws.35 Yet, at least concerning the issuance and
enforcement of protection orders, Congress has been repeatedly clear
that it both trusts and needs tribes to provide this protection.36
Not only is the judicial reasoning of implicit divestiture
troubling, the scrutiny of perceived flaws of tribal law is largely
irrelevant to whether a tribe possesses jurisdiction. The exercise of
congressional plenary power over Indian affairs, including the power
to determine the extent of a tribe’s remaining inherent sovereignty, is
a political question and judicial scrutiny should be limited.37 Instead
of restraint however, courts have been ravenous in slashing tribal
regulatory efforts based on the perceived inferiority and foreignness of
tribes.38 Indeed, scholars note that in light of Montana and its progeny,
32

Michalyn Steele, Congressional Power and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs 2018
UTAH L. REV. 307, 309 n.9 (2018).
33
Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337.
34
Dolgencorp, Inc., 746 F.3d at 181 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“The elements of Doe’s
claims under Indian tribal law are unknown to Dolgencorp and may very well be
undiscoverable by it.”).
35
Cooley, 593 U.S., slip op. at 6-7.
36
Hearing on S. 1763, S. 872, & S. 1192 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
112th Cong. 13–14 (Nov. 10, 2011) (statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, Associate
Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“Without the ability to issue and enforce
protection orders and to get full faith and credit for those protection orders, there is
a real risk to Native women to be threatened again.”).
37
Steele, supra note 32, at 309 n.12 (2018) (noting that “the legislature, rather than
the judiciary, is the branch best suited by institutional competencies to address
questions of inherent tribal sovereignty in federal law within the tripartite federal
system”). Note: the “political question” doctrine was nefariously relied upon by
nineteenth and early twentieth century federal courts to excuse despicably harmful
federal policies against Indigenous Peoples. See WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE
COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER
DECIDED 177 (2012) (describing the reliance of the U.S. Supreme Court on the
political-question doctrine to avoid providing remedies for violations of the
Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867 by the Jerome Commission in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock).
38
Fletcher, supra note 20, at 45 (“There is a clear trend surfacing in the small
universe of Supreme Court cases involving tribal civil jurisdiction over
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unless a nonmember has consented to tribal civil jurisdiction,
nonmembers have ample latitude to misbehave.39 At least since 1978,
congressional expressions regarding tribal powers have essentially
been in response to these judicially-created jurisdictional messes.
B. Congress has Previously Restored Implicitly Divested
Tribal Powers: The Duro-Fix
In 1990, as an extension of Oliphant’s implicit divestiture
logic, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in addition to lacking criminal
jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians, tribes also lack inherent criminal
jurisdiction to prosecute nonmember Indians.40 In a string of alarming
judicial blows against tribal sovereignty, Duro v. Reina was especially
devastating: as in Oliphant, the Duro Court reasoned that components
of tribal sovereignty were “implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent
status.”41 This perception that sovereignty was diminished, as opposed
to an explicit Congressional or treaty provision, was despite tribes’
exercising such authority for nearly two hundred years under
American rule, and long before the concepts of “member” and
“Indian” were relevant. It was despite federal legislation broadly
defining criminal jurisdiction in Indian country based on defendants’
racial status as Indians, rather than more narrowly as tribal members.42
And it was despite the legal vacuum created by the Duro holding in
which no sovereign would have the authority to prosecute a class of

nonmembers—the conduct of the nonmembers determined to challenge tribal
jurisdiction is worsening.”).
39
Id. at 42.
40
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695 (1990).
41
Id. at 686.
42
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 80 (6th ed. 2015);
see e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153.
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nonmember Indian offenders for certain crimes committed in Indian
country.43
Congress quickly responded with a “Duro-fix,”44 clarifying
that tribal self-government powers include the authority “to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”45 Congress was careful not to
call this verification of tribal power a delegation of federal powers.
Instead, the Duro-fix amended 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) to define tribal
powers as “inherent powers of Indian tribes,” that were “recognized
and affirmed,” by Congress.
Was this language enough to settle the affirmation versus
delegation debate? United States v. Lara46 answered that question. The
Court confirmed the Duro-fix was an affirmation of a tribe’s inherent
sovereign power, not a delegation of federal powers. The Court
additionally confirmed that affirmations of inherent tribal powers were
Congressional feasible. While Duro restricted tribal powers, those
tribal powers merely lay dormant; they did not evaporate. So, through
its plenary power and pursuant to its trust responsibility, Congress
“awakened” those tribal powers by affirming their existence and
recognizing their present applicability (comparable to Congress’
power to re-recognize formerly terminated tribes).47

43

In non-P.L. 280 jurisdictions, tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian
defendants that commit “non-major” crimes (crimes that are not enumerated in the
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, over which the federal government has
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute) against Indian victims, and over Indian
defendants who commit victimless crimes. Because federal jurisdiction under the
Major Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, are defined by the
Indian status of the defendant and the victim, rather than their membership status,
the Duro v. Reina holding meant no sovereign has the power to prosecute
nonmember Indian defendants who commit a non-major crime against an Indian
victim or commit a victimless crime.
44
The term “fix” is used here to indicate the congressional enactment of federal
statute(s) overruling or partially overruling of prior precedent.
45
Pub. L. No. 102-153 (1991) (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
46
541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004).
47
See, e.g., United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting the
power of Congress to restore the “terminated” Menominee Tribe was an exercise of
reinstated inherent power, not delegated federal power).
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C. Implicitly Divesting the Tribal Authority to Issue Civil
Protection Orders: Martinez
Even when characterized as “domestic dependent nations,”48
tribes have been held to retain “attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory.”49 At a minimum, these attributes have
always included the power to issue civil protection orders against all
persons within Indian country. Just as Oliphant and Duro gutted tribal
criminal powers, Montana and its progeny gutted many tribal civil
powers. However, a tribe’s authority to protect the physical safety and
well-being of persons through a civil protection order likely survives
by falling squarely within the second Montana exception, much like
Cooley. This was so well understood that in 2000, Congress presumed
the survival of this inherent jurisdiction and passed the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), which clarified tribal civil authority to
enforce such tribal protection orders through the full faith and credit
clause.50
However, in Martinez v. Martinez, a federal district court in the
State of Washington disagreed. The district court held that VAWA did
not explicitly confer sufficient tribal civil jurisdiction to issue a
protection order and that VAWA simply provided jurisdiction “in
matters arising within the authority of the tribe.”51 A tribe would only
be able to issue a protection order after a case-by-case Montana
analysis.52 The court then held that in this instance, the Suquamish
Indian Tribe failed the Montana analysis and therefore lacked the
inherent authority to issue a civil protection order against a
nonmember for an incident that arose on fee land within reservation
48

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 10 (1831).
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
50
See Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464
(adding the following language as 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e): “For purposes of this section,
a tribal court shall have full civil jurisdiction to enforce protection orders, including
authority to enforce any orders through civil contempt proceedings, exclusion of
violators from Indian lands, and other appropriate mechanisms, in matters arising
within the authority of the tribe”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (“Any protection
order issued that is consistent with subsection (b) of this section by the court of one
State, Indian tribe, or territory . . . shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court
of another State, Indian tribe, or territory . . . and enforced by the court and law
enforcement personnel of the other State, Indian tribal government or Territory
[territory] as if it were the order of the enforcing State, Indian tribe, or territory.”).
51
See Martinez v. Martinez, No. C08-5503 FDB, 2008 WL 5262793, at *5 and *8
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) (2005)).
52
See id. *12-14.
49
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boundaries.53 The court relied on the fact that the petitioner, while
Indian, was not a member of the Tribe, and while she may have
suffered, her suffering did not imperil the subsistence of the tribal
community.54 Effectively, pursuant to the legal reasoning of Montana,
the ability of the Tribe to protect her had been implicitly divested at
some time in the past.
Like Duro, Martinez signaled a disturbing trend toward the
implicit divestment of tribal sovereignty: tribes purportedly lack civil
powers to protect nonmember victims from nonmember conduct
through civil protection orders. This trend persisted despite tribes’
authority to criminally prosecute nonmember Indians for violating
civil protection orders, and despite Congress’s clear preference for
tribes to possess and use this power to protect member Indians,
nonmember Indians, and non-Indian victims as evidenced in VAWA.
Martinez created a legal vacuum that exacerbated the public safety
crisis in Indian country. So, in 2013, Congress updated § 2265(e) with
a “Martinez-fix.”
D. Martinez-Fix: 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e)
VAWA was originally enacted in 1994 and was reauthorized
in 2000, 2005, and 2013, displaying a groundswell of political will
needed to address multiple forms of gender-based violence. While not
always uncontroversial,55 VAWA has presented a uniquely ripe
opportunity for tribal advocates to address the urgent human rights
crisis of implicit divestiture through a politically effective mechanism.
There is much remaining work to do in remedying the ills of implicit
divestiture, but gender-based violence is a good place to start.
In 2013, as part of the reauthorization of VAWA, Congress
updated 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) to verify tribes’ civil jurisdictional
authority to issue and enforce protection orders against all persons.56
Modifying VAWA 2000’s initial recognition of tribal authority over

53

Id. at *15-16.
Id. at *6 (citing Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. 316).
55
See e.g. Tribal Provisions of Violence Against Women Act Survive Fight,
INDIANZ.COM (Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.indianz.com/News/2013/02/28/tribalprovisions-of-violence-1.asp (“VAWA has enjoyed bipartisan support since it was
first enacted in 1994. But the bill became a hot issue during the 112th Congress when
Democrats included provisions to protect American Indian and Alaska Native
women, as well as immigrants and gay and lesbian victims.”).
56
Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54, Sec. 905 (2013).
54
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the civil enforcement of protection orders,57 VAWA 2013 added the
words “issue” and “involving any persons” to provide a Martinezfix:58
For purposes of this section, a court of an Indian tribe
shall have full civil jurisdiction to issue and
enforce protection orders involving any person,
including the authority to enforce any orders through
civil contempt proceedings, to exclude violators from
Indian land, and to use other appropriate mechanisms,
in matters arising anywhere in the Indian country of the
Indian tribe (as defined in section 1151) or otherwise
within the authority of the Indian tribe.59
This amended version of § 2265(e) obviates the need for a
Montana analysis, verifying that tribes have the power to both issue
and enforce civil protection orders over all persons in matters arising
anywhere in the Indian country of the tribe or otherwise within the
authority of the tribe. Section 2265(e) is therefore a Martinez fix and a
partial Montana-fix.
II.

The Latest Cloud in a Storm of Doubts: Implicit
Divestiture and Spurr v. Pope

In one of the first cases to consider this 2013 provision, the
Sixth Circuit examined the application of 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) in
Spurr v. Pope.60 The court addressed whether the Nottawaseppi Huron
Band of the Potawatomi (“NHBP”),61 a federally recognized tribe, had
57

Pub. L. No. 106-386, Sec. 1101(e) (Oct. 28, 2000) (“For purposes of this section,
a tribal court shall have full civil jurisdiction to enforce protection orders, including
authority to enforce any orders through civil contempt proceedings, exclusion of
violators from Indian lands, and other appropriate mechanisms, in matters arising
within the authority of the tribe.”).
58
Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54, Sec. 905 (2013).
59
18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) (emphases added). Section 2265(a)-(d) addresses full faith
and credit of protection orders issued by states, Indian tribes, or territories, provides
a definition of protection order, addresses cross or counter petitions for a protection
order, and notifications or registrations of protection orders.
60
936 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2019).
61
The Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi is a federally recognized tribal
government located at the Pine Creek Indian Reservation near Athens, Michigan. It
is one of the seven federally recognized Potawatomi tribes within the United States.
It consists of more than 1,500 enrolled tribal members. After being forced to cede its
lands and remove to lands in Oklahoma, its tribal members escaped and returned to
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jurisdiction to issue a personal protection order against a non-Indian
for a matter arising in Indian country. The Sixth Circuit held that
§ 2265(e) does in fact provide tribal courts such civil authority.62 In
Spurr the petitioner, Nathaniel Spurr (“N. Spurr”), a tribal member,
resided in Nottawaseppi Indian country and sought an ex parte
protection order from the Nottawaseppi Tribal Court alleging that
Joy Spurr (“J. Spurr”), a non-Indian residing outside of Indian country,
engaged in a campaign of harassment against him.63 The Nottawaseppi
tribal judge issued a protection order against J. Spurr.64 J. Spurr
appealed to the Nottawaseppi Supreme Court, which affirmed the
tribal trial court,65 and held that tribal law authorized the tribal court to
issue civil protection orders against a non-Indian who resided outside
of the boundaries of the Nottawaseppi Indian country. The NHBP
Supreme Court further held that § 2265(e) was a reaffirmation of
inherent tribal authority and a partial overruling of Montana.66
J. Spurr then sought relief in federal court in the Western
District of Michigan. The district court agreed that § 2265(e)
established tribal civil jurisdiction, but did not make a finding as to the
origin of the powers authorized in § 2265(e).67 The court simply noted
that the plain text of the statute “clearly establishes the Tribal Court’s
‘full civil jurisdiction’ under federal law” to issue civil protection
orders in matters involving nonmembers.68
their native lands in Michigan where they continue to reside. See History,
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF POTAWATOMI, https://nhbpi.org/history/.
62
Spurr v. Pope, 936 F.3d at 489.
63
Id. at 481.
64
Id.
65
Spurr v. Spurr, Supreme Court Case No. 17-287-APP, Nottawaseppi Huron Band
of the Potawatomi Tribal Court (2018). Anticipating a federal challenge to tribal
court authority, the NHBP Supreme Court decision provided significant factual and
legal analysis, including the extreme nature of J. Spurr’s harassment which
ultimately targeted the court itself.
66
Id. at 13.
67
Spurr v. Pope, No. 1:17-CV-1083, 2018 WL 10075919 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 27,
2018), aff'd, 936 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2019).
68
Id. at 6. The district court determined that it had federal question jurisdiction but
failed to address the issue of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a
jurisdictional doctrine which must be addressed before the merits. The NHBP
explicitly waived sovereign immunity as to tribal judge Pope, but asserted sovereign
immunity as to the NHBP Supreme Court and the NHBP Tribe. Tribes have
sovereign immunity that protects the tribe and arms of the tribe acting on behalf of
the tribe. Congress must unequivocally and expressly waive tribal sovereign
immunity. Courts will not lightly assume that Congress intended to undermine tribal
self-government. A waiver must be shouted and not whispered. See, e.g., Kiowa
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998).
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J. Spurr then appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Sixth Circuit held that the Tribe must point to one of two means
to exercise tribal civil authority over nonmembers: inherent sovereign
tribal powers, or an act of Congress.69 The court held that § 2265(e)
unambiguously granted tribal courts the power exercised by the
Nottawaseppi Tribal Court in that case. But, in a footnote, the Sixth
Circuit opined that the federal statute was an “express delegation of
authority to the tribes obviat[ing] the need to meet one of the two
Montana exceptions.”70
While not directly addressing the origin of the powers vested
in § 2265(e), the Sixth Circuit’s curious footnote suddenly implicated
the affirmation versus delegation debate. Did the Sixth Circuit, with
the term “express delegation” intend to hold that § 2265(e) is a
delegation of federal powers? It is not clear. More likely, the footnote’s
relevance is to the practical application of § 2265(e). Namely, that a
tribe need not also prove its issuance-of-a-protection-order authority
under a federal common law Montana analysis, because § 2265(e)
already confirms that power. This concern is a logical extension of
other tribal civil regulatory debates, like whether the authority to
regulate water quality under the Clean Water Act71 also requires a
simultaneous Montana analysis.72 Nevertheless, the term “delegation”
is charged, with significant consequences for how a tribe exercises a
power. The court’s use of the term, however innocuous, necessitates
an examination of the origin of the powers verified in § 2265(e).
III.

What is at Stake? The Consequences of Exercising
Inherent Powers Versus Delegated Federal Powers

Determining whether § 2265(e) is a delegation of federal
powers or an affirmation of inherent tribal powers has meaningful
collateral consequences on the tribal issuance and enforcement of
protection orders. These consequences impact both the tribe’s selfdetermination and victims’ access to safety. For any protection order—
whether it is issued by a state, territory, or tribe, and whether that entity
is exercising delegated federal authority or inherent authority—
Section 2265(a)-(b) requires that the issuing court have personal
69

Spurr v. Pope, 936 F.3d at 485.
Id. at 486 n.2.
71
42 U.S.C. § 7601.
72
See Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provision, 81 Fed. Reg.
30183, 90 (May 16, 2016) (clarifying that courts no longer need to perform a separate
Montana analysis as to whether tribes can be treated as states under the Clean Water
Act).
70
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jurisdiction over the parties and matter, and that the respondent receive
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.73 However, the
sources of law used to determine whether personal jurisdiction was
met and whether the respondent’s due process rights were protected
changes depending on the issuing jurisdiction and whether the origin
of their power is delegated or inherent. The sources of law also affect
the tribe’s choice of civil remedies for enforcing the protection order.
The ability to make one’s own laws includes the inverse: to be
exempt from other sovereigns’ laws. In part, tribes’ domestic
dependent status means that while tribes exist within the United States,
they are also separate. In this way, Indian country has been
characterized as an “intraterritoriality”74 or an “anomalous zone.”75
The typical constraints of the U.S. Constitution on governmental
action—like the requirement to provide due process and equal
protection—do not apply to tribes,76 tribal laws do.
Determining whether a tribal power is an expression of
inherent authority or of delegated authority therefore affects whether a
tribe continues to operate in its anomalous zone. An affirmation of
inherent authority would keep tribes in their extraconstitutional
sovereign status, enjoyed because tribes are domestic dependent
nations over which Congress has plenary power77 to verify
jurisdiction, but without the typical “Bill of Rights” strings that would
otherwise attach to non-Indian legislation.78 The binding source of law
is tribal law. But if § 2265(e) is a delegation of federal authority, the
tribe is no longer exercising extraconstitutional inherent sovereign
powers, but rather is serving as a quasi-federal agent, and must
therefore provide the federal due process protections that other federal
bodies must provide. Federal law suddenly becomes a binding source
of law on the tribe.
73

18 U.S.C. § 2265(a)-(b).
KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION
OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 5-8, 16, 46-47 (2009).
75
Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996).
76
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“It follows that, as the powers of local
self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the Constitution,
they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment . . . .”).
77
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the
tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning,
and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled
by the judicial department of the government.”).
78
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993) (“Congress has plenary authority
to alter [the] jurisdictional guideposts.”); see also Lara, 541 U.S. at 196 (holding that
“Congress has the constitutional power to relax restrictions that the political branches
have . . . placed on the exercise of a tribe's inherent legal authority”).
74
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Congressional
acknowledgement
of
tribal
extraconstitutionality is not new. Congress enacted the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA)79 in 1968 in response to tribes’ extraconstitutional
status. ICRA statutorily extends civil rights protections to individuals
under tribal jurisdiction.80 ICRA contains civil rights terminology
similar to those found in the U.S. Constitution, like free exercise of
religion, equal protection, and due process.81 ICRA was frequently
framed as constitutional rights for Indians,82 and thereby imposes a
distinct Western flavor of adversarial, individual-focused law into
tribal law. ICRA’s focus on individual rights can clash with tribal
values of community rights and infringe on tribal sovereignty.83
However, ICRA has notable differences from the
U.S. Constitution.84 ICRA only selectively incorporated (and in some
instances, modified) the protections of the Bills of Rights.85
Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez held that ICRA provides no federal cause of action other than
habeas corpus, and upheld tribal sovereign immunity.86 As a result,
ICRA has been interpreted and enforced almost exclusively by tribal
courts. Tribes determine what ICRA rights mean in a tribal context and
within a tribal cultural analysis. By finding no federal cause of action
and tribal sovereign immunity in Santa Clara, the Court enshrined
79

Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, Title II (1968) (subsequently amended in 1986, 1991,
2010, and 2013, codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304).
80
See Carrie Garrow, Habeas Corpus Petitions in Federal and Tribal Courts:
A Search for Individualized Justice, 24 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF
RIGHTS J. 137, 141 (2015) (“Some members of Congress expressed shock that
Indian Nations were outside the reach of the Constitution.”).
81
See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1), (8).
82
Lawrence R. Baca, Reflections on the Role of the United States Department of
Justice in Enforcing the Indian Civil Rights Act, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
AT 40, 2 (Kristen A. Carpenter et al. eds., 2012) (noting that many courts and
commentators incorrectly referred to the statutory rights of ICRA as ‘constitutional
rights’, which colored their thinking about those rights in a tribe-by-tribe legal and
cultural setting).
83
Garrow, supra note 80, at 141.
84
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1), (7), (10). ICRA, unlike the U.S. Constitution,
does not prohibit against the establishment of a religion. ICRA also only requires a
six-person jury for a criminal trial. Most notably, ICRA imposes a steep sentencing
and fine limitation.
85
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978); see also Melissa Tatum,
Establishing Penalties for Violations of Protection Orders: What Tribal
Governments Need to Know, 13 KAN. J. L. & POLICY 123, 131 (2003) (noting
Congress’s failure to perfectly mirror the Constitution in ICRA was deliberate, not
inadvertent).
86
436 U.S. at 58.
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tribal courts as the appropriate forum for adjudicating disputes,
including interpreting whether “rights” have been upheld according to
tribal case law. So, while ICRA infringes on tribal sovereignty by
statutorily imposing Western values on tribes, Santa Clara recognizes
tribal sovereignty and tribes’ “extraconstitutional” authority to
develop tribal-specific bodies of case law interpreting the scope and
value of those ICRA provisions.
For example, in Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court interpreted the ICRA right to not incriminate
oneself87 to include a comparable Miranda-type warning from law
enforcement.88 Rather than drawing upon a Western history of
government infringement on individual rights, the court relied on the
Navajo principle of hazhó’ógo: meaning loosely that patience and
respect are required when dealing with another human being.89
However, if instead of exercising inherent powers (albeit under
the limiting frame of ICRA), tribes were exercising delegated federal
powers, then the Santa Clara tribal case law framework would not
apply. Instead, a tribe would be acting as a federal agent. Alleged due
process violations when issuing a protection order could likely be filed
directly in federal court, circumventing tribal justice systems. Instead
of interpreting the issuance of protection orders and potential attendant
civil rights violations under tribal law, a delegation of federal power
would attach binding federal case law. While monumental in U.S. law,
the watershed cases of Gideon90 and Miranda91 reflect Western values
and struggles to protect individual rights from intrusive and
untrustworthy governments. These values and histories are not
necessarily reflective of tribal values and histories, and their forced
incorporation into tribal law—often without community buy-in—
leaves little room for tribes to integrate those holdings into other tribal
laws, or to experiment with how they might interact with customs,
traditions, codes, and tribal constitutions.
A finding that § 2265(e) delegates federal authority also can
impact a tribe’s civil enforcement of protection orders. The distinction
87

25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4).
Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, 2004 WL 5658107 (Navajo
Dec. 16, 2004).
89
Id. at *5.
90
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (holding the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of a right to assistance of counsel applies to criminal defendants in state
court by way of the Fourteenth Amendment).
91
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 346 (1966) (holding the Fifth Amendment requires
law enforcement officials to advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to
obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody).
88
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between civil and criminal enforcement can be murky, especially when
it comes to the detainment of noncompliant respondents. At least under
the wording of § 2265(e), tribal authority to criminally enforce the
violation of protection orders is untouched. Tribes retain their inherent
authority to criminally prosecute Indians,92 and their authority to
prosecute non-Indians is re-recognized in section 904 of VAWA’s
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction provisions.93 Tribes
also have access to civil remedies, including civil fines, restitution,
community service, and civil contempt, among others. Civil remedies
for protection orders tend to be generally more consistent with most
tribes’ traditional approaches to justice.94 However, because § 2265(e)
verifies tribal civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce protection orders
involving any person, a finding that § 2265(e) delegates federal
enforcement injects federal case law for civil enforcement remedies.
These additional due process protections can pose a logistical
roadblock to victims located in tribal jurisdictions unable to satisfy
those additional requirements and contradicts Congress’s explicit
desire for tribal courts to have the civil authority to enforce protection
orders.95
IV.

Finding the Origins of Power

A. Inherent Sources of Power
There is only a limited set of circumstances and accompanying
case law examining Congressional bestowments of powers to other
sovereigns. Does Congress possess the requisite authority to empower
a tribe with jurisdictional powers? Is this Congressional action
necessarily an affirmation or a delegation, or can Congress choose?
This analysis has largely taken place within the context of the dual
sovereignty doctrine regarding double jeopardy.96
In Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle,97 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the origin of the Territory of Puerto Rico’s prosecutorial powers
was not separate and inherent, but rather was a delegation of federal

92

See, e.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at 210.
Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 121, Sec. 904 (2013).
94
Tatum, supra note 85, at 130.
95
Id.
96
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (“[A]n act denounced as a crime
by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity
of both and may be punished by each.”).
97
136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).
93
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power.98 Consequently, double jeopardy applied to a federal criminal
prosecution and a subsequent Puerto Rican prosecution for the same
gun sale violation. Because Puerto Rico was fully colonized by the
Spanish and ceded to the United States as part of the 1898 Treaty of
Paris, all of Puerto Rico’s preexisting inherent sovereignty was lost.
Its authority to organize and self-govern, including to prosecute
criminal offenses, thereby derived from a federal delegation under
United States law, namely the 1950 Act.
Interestingly, the Court found that the 1950 Act,99 recognizing
and encouraging Puerto Rico’s self-governance, evidenced
congressional intent to recognize inherent territorial powers. However,
the totality of Puerto Rico’s inherent powers of self-governance had
been decimated by colonization. There were therefore no surviving
dormant inherent powers to awaken. Instead, to fulfill Congress’s
intent to encourage Puerto Rico’s self-government, Congress could
only re-empower Puerto Rico through the delegation of federal
powers, regardless of its intent. To underscore the limitations of
Congress to revive Puerto Rico’s territorial powers, the Court
compared Puerto Rico with Indian tribes. Unlike Puerto Rico, tribal
inherent sovereignty was never fully extinguished. Because tribes
retain some inherent powers, Congress has the power to revive other
inherent tribal powers if dormant.100 The Court pointed to the tribal
exercise of prosecutorial powers, including those simultaneous with a
federal prosecution for the same incident, as examples of inherent
sovereign powers that do not trigger double jeopardy.101
The Court all but conceded that the logic of the dual
sovereignty doctrine is strange. Justice Kagan noted that while the
temptation is to examine the extent to which a sovereign such as Puerto
Rico self-governs, including the nature of its criminal justice system,
“for whatever reason, the test we have devised . . . overtly disregards
common indicia of sovereignty.”102 Rather, the dual sovereignty
98

Id. at 1875.
Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, § 1, 64 Stat. 319.
100
Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1872, citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at
323.
101
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313; see also Lara, 541 U.S. at 197 and 210 (holding no
double jeopardy for the prosecution of a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians in Spirit Lake Tribal Court followed by a subsequent federal
prosecution); United States v. Antelope, 548 F.3d 1115, 1157 (8th Cir. 2008)
(holding no double jeopardy for the prosecution of a Cheyenne River Sioux tribal
member in Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court followed by a subsequent federal
prosecution).
102
Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1870.
99
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doctrine hinges on a single criterion: the “ultimate source” of the
power. Under federal Indian law, tribes are considered the ultimate
source of their powers.103
Sánchez Valle confirms that, at least compared to Puerto Rico,
tribes have retained a sufficient amount of their inherent sovereignty
to qualify as distinct under the dual sovereignty doctrine. Regardless
of the diversity of tribes, the extent to which a tribe has experienced
colonization, or the extent to which a tribe now exercises their
sovereign powers, all tribes are homogeneously held to retain this
sufficient sovereignty. Sánchez Valle also confirms that because
Puerto Rico did not retain any surviving inherent sovereignty,
Congress lost the ability to awaken those powers. Conversely, because
at least some tribal inherent sovereignty survives, implicitly divested
inherent tribal powers are not forever lost, they are merely dormant.
The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed this in United States v. Lara,
finding that the Duro-fix, a statutory recognition of tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, was a congressionally
permissible affirmation of inherent tribal powers.104 For tribes,
Congress has the power to awaken those dormant inherent tribal
powers, not just delegate federal ones.
B. Can Congress Delegate Powers to Tribes?
While Congress may have the power to affirm inherent tribal
powers, could Congress nevertheless choose to delegate federal
powers to tribes? In Sánchez Valle, Congress had clear authority to
delegate federal powers to Puerto Rico pursuant to the U.S.
Constitution’s Territory Clause.105 But, delegations of federal powers
are otherwise generally constrained to executive agencies within the
federal government. Specifically, the nondelegation doctrine prohibits
Congress from delegating its legislative authority to private entities.106

103

Id. (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320).
Lara, 541 U.S. at 204.
105
Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868, citing Organic Act 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77
and U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
106
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989); see also U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States . . . .”).
104
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In addition, the power delegated must have a nexus to a delegate’s
traditional scope of authority.107
In the 1975 case United States v. Mazurie,108 a unanimous
Supreme Court found that Congress can delegate federal powers to
tribes primarily because tribes, unlike private organizations, possess a
distinct inherent sovereignty. The Court found that Congress could
delegate federal authority to the Eastern Shoshone and Northern
Arapaho Tribes to regulate alcohol sales on their reservation, including
with respect to non-Indians.109 Notably, the Court reasoned that
limitations on congressional delegation authority are less stringent
when the delegation recipient “possesses independent authority over
the subject matter.”110 Because tribes can regulate the internal and
social relations of tribal life, and because alcohol “is just such a
matter,” Congress’s delegation showed a sufficient delegation
nexus.111 The Rehnquist Court in Mazurie noted it need not determine
whether the Tribes have sufficient inherent authority to impose the
alcohol regulation. Instead, the Court simply determined there was
enough inherent tribal authority to justify the congressional delegation,
and that low bar finding is all that is required.112
Most recently, Mazurie has been upheld in a 2021 Fifth Circuit
en banc appeal finding a proper delegation of federal power to tribes
in the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).113 ICWA’s § 1915(c)
allows tribes to re-order foster care and pre-adoptive placement
preferences for an Indian child in a state court proceeding.114 The
Court noted that such authority is unquestionably within a tribe’s
inherent power for tribal child welfare proceedings, supporting a
sufficient nexus.115 The court noted that even though tribes are separate
sovereigns from the federal government, Congress may incorporate
the laws of another sovereign into federal law without violating the
nondelegation doctrine.116
107

United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 556-57.
Id.
109
Id. at 556.
110
Id. at 556-57 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936)).
111
Id. at 557.
112
This is a seemingly Montana-light test. See infra Section II.A., regarding the
Montana test.
113
Brackeen, et. al. v. Haaland, et. al., No. 18-11479 (5th Cir., Apr. 6, 2021) (en
banc).
114
25 U.S.C. § 1915(c).
115
Brackeen, slip op. at 129 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
116
Id., slip op. at 128, 136-37 citing United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 29394 (1958).
108
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Mazurie’s holding has been extended to include delegations of
environmental regulatory authority. In Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,117 Justice White in his
plurality opinion cited the Clean Water Act’s “treatment as states”
provisions as an example of an express delegation of federal authority
to a tribe.118 That finding of a delegation of federal power was
explicitly upheld in 1998 by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Montana v. Environmental Protection Agency.119 Curiously however,
and despite Brendale, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
still required tribes to separately demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis,
that they possessed the inherent jurisdiction to regulate under the Clean
Water Act pursuant to Montana’s tribal civil jurisdiction analysis. This
effectively nullified the Mazurie test and negated the federal
delegation in the Clean Water Act. This was also in contradiction to
the EPA’s determination that the Clean Air Act (containing similar
“treatment as state” provisions), was a valid express federal delegation
of authority to tribes.120 However, in 2016, after an extensive comment
period, the EPA revised its approach and concluded definitively that
Congress expressly delegated authority to tribes to administer the
Clean Water Act regulatory programs, including over non-Indian
activities on fee lands.121
In addition to tribes, Congress has delegated federal powers to
other sovereigns, including states. This includes delegating federal
authority to exercise criminal and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction in
Indian country through Public Law 280.122 Delegations to states, like
to tribes, have been found to be constitutionally sound.123
If Congress had intended to delegate federal powers to tribes to
issue and enforce protection orders in § 2265(e), such a delegation
would likely survive a Mazurie analysis. Tribes, even under a narrow
117

492 U.S. 408 (1989).
Id. at 428 (opinion of White, J.).
119
Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998).
120
See 40 CFR part 49; Clean Air Act Tribal Authority Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254,
7255 (Feb. 12, 1998), aff’d, Arizona Public Service Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C.
Circuit 2000).
121
Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provision, 81 Fed. Reg. 30183,
30190 (May 16, 2016).
122
Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162 & 28 U.S.C. § 1360). See
generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987)
(describing Public Law 280, which “expressly granted six States . . . jurisdiction over
specified areas of Indian Country”),
123
See e.g. Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235, 239 (1919) (holding that Congress could
select a state court as “agency” to decide the validity of conveyance of property rights
in land to citizens of five Indian Tribes).
118
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view of tribal sovereignty, retain the powers to protect the health and
welfare of the tribe.124 A delegation of federal powers to issue and
enforce protection orders therefore likely satisfies the low bar
nondelegation nexus requirement.
Congress has the authority to both affirm previously dormant
inherent tribal powers, as well as delegate new federal powers to tribes.
To determine whether the authority verified in § 2265(e) is an
affirmation or a delegation, the question is what did Congress intend?
The language of the statute, the context of the statute, the legislative
history, and prior congressional affirmations of tribal powers after
comparable implicit divestiture restraints all point to § 2265(e) being
an affirmation of inherent tribal powers.
V.

Finding the Origins of Power in 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) to be
an Affirmation of Inherent Sovereignty

A. Canons of Construction, the Indian
Construction, and the Trust Responsibility

Canons

of

The canons of statutory interpretation provide several tools for
determining whether 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) is an affirmation of inherent
tribal powers like the Duro-fix, or whether it is a federal delegation as
in Mazurie. Generally, statutory interpretation starts with the language
of the statute itself.125 However, when a statute is ambiguous, courts
may also review the context of the legislative bill and the legislative
history of a statute to glean clues about congressional intent.126 Courts
may also use the canon of constitutional avoidance where one
interpretation of a statute would raise serious doubt about the overall
statute’s constitutionality. The court may look for a fairly plausible

124

Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (noting a tribe retains the inherent power to exercise
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the health or welfare of the
tribe).
125
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980);
see also Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009) (stating that when statutory
language is “plain and unambiguous,” it should be applied “according to its terms.”).
126
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U.S. 411, 418 (1948); United Steelworkers of
Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979).
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reading that would avoid the constitutional issue.127 A matter not
covered by a statute should be treated as intentionally omitted.128
However, when examining Indian law, such as a federal
verification of tribal powers, the standard principles of statutory
interpretation do not have their usual force.129 The Indian law canons
of construction call for statutes to be liberally construed in favor of the
Indians, and require that all ambiguities be resolved in their favor.130
Tribal sovereignty should be preserved unless congressional intent is
clear and unambiguous to the contrary.131 The Indian law canons of
construction are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the
federal government and tribes.132 In exercising authority over Indian
affairs, the federal government is bound to act as a fiduciary toward its
trustees, the tribes. This includes legislative action like recognizing
tribal civil authority.
The trust responsibility is a contextual veneer, calling for the
framing of statutory interpretation within the federal-tribal legal
history. There is no single origin of the trust responsibility. Initial
federal-tribal legal relations were sparse, limited to a settler-colonial
negotiation centered on keeping peace and federal exclusivity over
land sales. In numerous negotiated treaties, the United States used
language to acknowledge U.S. sovereignty, but did so as it related to
tribal dependence on the United States and the federal government’s
role in “managing all their affairs.”133 This positioning has been used
127
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
128
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES,
TOOLS, AND TRENDS 54 (Apr. 5, 2018) (“Casus Omissus: A matter not covered by a
statute should be treated as intentionally omitted.”)
129
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
130
COHEN’S HANDBOOK § 2.02[1], supra note 21, at 113; see, e.g., County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
269 (1992) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 767-68) (“When we
are faced with these two possible constructions [of a statute], our choice between
them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian
jurisprudence: ‘Statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with
ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.’”).
131
See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980).
132
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
133
See, e.g., Treaty with the Wyandotte, art. 7, Jan. 21 1785, Stat., 16 (“The said
Indian nations, do acknowledge themselves and all their tribes to be under the
protection of the United States and of no other sovereign whatsoever.”); Treaty with
the Choctaw, art. 2, Jan. 3,1786, 7 Stat. 21 (“[T]o be under the protection of the
United States of America, and no other sovereign whosoever.”); Treaty with the
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to emphasize that while the federal government enjoys extensive
power over Indian affairs, with that power come federal obligations.
The United States Supreme Court further solidified this
protector-like language: Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia declared tribes to be “domestic dependent nations,”
and likened the federal-tribal relationship to that of a “ward to his
guardian.”134 The analogy was likely intended to focus more on the
subservient need of tribes rather than on the positive obligations of the
federal government towards tribes.135 But this ward-guardian
relationship has evolved into a modern federal trust responsibility
doctrine that includes exacting fiduciary standards.136 Most modern
federal legislation, administrative action, and executive policy
statements reference and reaffirm the federal trust responsibility to
tribes.137
The trust responsibility doctrine as applied to congressional
action is not dispositive. The doctrine has not served as the basis of a
judicial order forcing or invalidating congressional action.138 It does,
however, serve as a lens, motivating federal action and serving as
oversight of federal actions over Indian affairs.139 In interpreting a
statute, the plain language should be the primary guidepost.
Ambiguities should be framed within the legislative intent of that
statute, as found within the context of the legislative bill and the
Kaskaskia, art. 2, Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 78 (“The United States will take the
Kaskaskia tribe under their immediate care and patronage . . . .”); Treaty with the
Sauk and Foxes, art. 2, Nov. 3, 1804, 7 Stat. 84 (“The United States receive the united
Sac and Fox tribes into their friendship and protection, and the said tribes agree to
consider themselves under the protection of the United States and of no other power
whatsoever.”).
134
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); see generally COHEN’S
HANDBOOK § 5.04(3)(a), supra note 21, at 412-15.
135
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2 (“Their relations to the United States resemble that
of a ward to his guardian. They look to our Government for protection, rely upon its
kindness and its power, appeal to it for relief to their wants, and address the President
as their Great Father.”).
136
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 n.12 (1942) (noting that
payment of money to agents known to be dishonest violated private trust law
standards).
137
COHEN’S HANDBOOK § 5.04(3)(a), supra note 21, at 412; see, e.g., President
Barack Obama, Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 5,
2009) (“The United States has a unique legal and political relationship with Indian
tribal governments . . . .”).
138
COHEN’S HANDBOOK § 5.04(3)(a), supra note 21, at 415.
139
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3335,
REAFFIRMATION OF THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY TO FEDERALLY
RECOGNIZED TRIBES AND INDIVIDUAL INDIAN BENEFICIARIES (August 20, 2014).
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legislative history. But the trust responsibility must also frame that
legislative action. Statutory expansions of tribal powers should be
examined as in relation to the federal-tribal trust relationship.
Similarly, § 2265(e), as a tribal jurisdiction-fix must be viewed as a
manifestation of that federal-tribal relationship. Martinez created an
untenable legal vacuum that disempowered tribes, exposed victims,
and invited lawlessness in Indian country. The federal trust
responsibility to tribes should be used to frame Congress’s enactment
of § 2265(e). With these tools in mind, we examine the language of
§ 2265(e) and the context within which it was enacted.
B. The Plain Language of 18 U.S.C. § 2265
Section 905 of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization
Act of 2013 (“VAWA”) amends 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) to provide:
(e)Tribal Court Jurisdiction.—
For purposes of this section, a court of an Indian tribe
shall have full civil jurisdiction to issue and
enforce protection orders involving any person,
including the authority to enforce any orders through
civil contempt proceedings, to exclude violators from
Indian land, and to use other appropriate mechanisms,
in matters arising anywhere in the Indian country of the
Indian tribe (as defined in section 1151) or otherwise
within the authority of the Indian tribe.
Section 905 of VAWA amended an older version of 18 U.S.C. §
2265(e) (2000)140 which had provided:
(e)Tribal Court Jurisdiction.—
For purposes of this section, a tribal court shall have
full civil jurisdiction to enforce protection orders,
including authority to enforce any orders through civil
contempt proceedings, exclusion of violators from
Indian lands, and other appropriate mechanisms, in
matters arising within the authority of the tribe.
The plain language of § 2265(e) is silent as to the origins of the
verified issuance and enforcement of protection order powers. This is
140

The Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1494
(Oct. 28, 2000).
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notable since the Duro-fix was explicit in stating the origins of its
verified power as “inherent” that Congress was recognizing and
affirming.141 In contrast, Section 905 of VAWA 2013 only states that
an Indian tribe “shall have” civil protection order powers.
Congressional affirmations of another sovereign’s authority are rare,
and Congress tends to be explicit when it makes such a maneuver.
On the other hand, the Indian canons of construction call for
considering the impact on tribal self-determination. While affirmations
of inherent power are rare, delegations of federal powers to a tribe are
also quite extraordinary. A delegation would circumvent the
opportunity to mirror the Duro-fix, as well as the opportunity to uplift
tribal self-determination. A federal delegation, though a “fix” to
judicial restrictions, would impose new infringements on tribal
sovereignty through the injection of double jeopardy and federal
definitions of constitutional protections.142 When Congress infringes
on tribal self-determination, Congress should be explicit.143 Moreover,
delegations of federal powers to tribes tend to embed those delegated
powers into an existing federal regulatory scheme, with accompanying
federal scrutiny.144 In contrast, the powers verified in § 2265(e)
anticipate the civil issuance and enforcement of protection orders to
remain within tribal courts. Rather than provide for the federal scrutiny
of the tribal exercise of these powers, other jurisdictions are expected
to provide full faith and credit.145 “Shall have” does not seem to
evidence an accompanying federal regulatory framework of other
delegations, nor an intention to deviate from affirmation policy.
Further, within the plain language of the statute, finding a
delegation would render at least a portion of § 2265(e) useless. The
statute indicates that tribes shall have full civil authority to issue and
141

25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
See infra Section IV.
143
See, e.g., McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2469 (2020)
(holding that once a federal reservation is established, only Congress can diminish
or disestablish it through a “clear expression of congressional intent.”).
144
See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1161, as examined by Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 547 (delegating
federal powers to tribes to regulate liquor in Indian country, but only to the extent
those tribal regulations conform with the laws of the State, are certified by the
Secretary of the Interior, and are published in the Federal Register); 25 U.S.C. § 1915
(delegating federal powers to tribes to establish a different order of placement
preference, but for cases that are otherwise adjudicated in state court proceedings,
regulated by the remaining provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act); and
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (delegating federal powers to tribes to manage and protect water
resources, but within the regulatory framework of the Clean Water Act statute and
accompanying regulations).
145
18 U.S.C. § 2265(a).
142
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enforce civil protection orders in “matters arising anywhere in Indian
country” [according to 18 U.S.C. § 1151)] “or otherwise within the
authority of the tribe.”146 What impact does delegating a federal power
that is “otherwise within the authority of the tribe”? The tribe, by the
words of the statute, must already possess that other authority. At best,
assuming the statue is a delegation of federal powers, “otherwise
within the authority of the tribe” might clarify that the federal
delegation is not intended to limit or restrict any inherent tribal powers.
Though, such savings clauses are usually more apparent.
Rather than a federal delegation, the plain language of §
2265(e) demonstrates a congressional affirmation of inherent tribal
powers on at least four fronts. VAWA 2013 actually modified quite a
few different portions of § 2265(e). First, directly in response to
Martinez, VAWA 2013 added the terms “issue” and “involving any
person,” clarifying that tribes have the power to both enforce and issue
civil protection orders, and that this power extends to members,
nonmembers, and non-Indians alike. This clarification encompasses
both inherent powers that have not been disputed, such as the issuance
of protection orders over member Indians, and powers that have been
disputed, such as over Indians, as litigated in Spurr v. Pope. A federal
delegation likely would not need to delegate powers that tribes already
possess.
Second, VAWA 2013 clarified that these civil protection order
powers extend to all Indian country, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151.147
The older VAWA 2000 version of this statute only referenced tribal
lands in the context of a tribe’s power to exclude violators. “Tribal
lands” could possibly be interpreted as referencing all of § 1151’s
Indian country. Or, “tribal lands” could be read more narrowly to
include only Indian trust lands. By modifying § 2265(e) to specifically
reference § 1151, Congress ensured that a tribe’s civil protection order
powers extend to all of Indian country, including non-Indian fee
lands.148 Yet, like “involving any person,” tribes already possess
inherent powers on most of Indian country tribal lands, particularly
“trust lands.” Lumping together obvious inherent tribal powers with
purported delegated ones is a sloppy delegation, making it impossibly
difficult to distinguish when tribes are exercising their inherent powers
146

18 U.S.C. § 2265(e).
18 U.S.C. § 1151; see supra, note 10.
148
Because the Montana test injects doubt as to whether a tribe retains inherent civil
power over a non-Indian, particularly over non-Indian fee lands, the clarification of
referencing all of “Indian country” further negates the need to conduct Montana
analysis.
147
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and when they are exercising their delegated federal ones. Or, more
likely, the lumping taking place in “involving any person” and “Indian
country” are simply affirmations that inherent tribal powers now
indisputably extend over all these persons and territories.
Third, VAWA 2013 completely reworked the phrase
“otherwise within the authority of the tribe.” The VAWA 2000 text
stated that “a tribal court shall have full civil jurisdiction to enforce
protection orders … in matters arising within the authority of the
tribe.” “Within the authority of the tribe” is a reference to the surviving
inherent sovereignty a tribe retains after a Montana analysis.
Therefore, the VAWA 2000 version of the statute had the effect of
requiring a Montana analysis for each tribal issuance or enforcement
of a protection order. The Martinez court found that the Suquamish
Indian Tribe failed to satisfy the Montana test.149 VAWA 2013,
however, dispenses with the Montana analysis entirely by stating a
tribe “shall have full civil jurisdiction … in matters arising in the
Indian country of the Indian tribe.” No Montana analysis is necessary.
The VAWA 2013 statute continues, stating that a tribe “shall
have full civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce protection orders … in
matters arising [in Indian country] or otherwise within the authority of
the Indian tribe.”150 By craftily adding “or otherwise,” the phrase
“within the authority of the Indian tribe” transforms from requiring a
Montana analysis to expanding tribal civil jurisdiction to both all
matters arising in Indian country and matters that are otherwise within
tribal jurisdiction. Consider, for example, a person domiciled in Indian
country who is in a violent relationship with someone who lives in a
town bordering the tribal reservation. Numerous violent incidents take
place within the perpetrator’s apartment in town, but when the victim
returns to the tribal community, her fear of harm comes with her. The
matter may have arisen outside of Indian country, but when she returns
to Indian country, the Tribe has both the authority and obligation to
protect her.151 When exercising civil authority to issue and enforce
protection orders pursuant to the phrase “or otherwise within the
authority of the Tribe,” the “shall have” verification applies, and so no
Montana analysis is necessary. This has effectively provided a partial
Montana-fix. A delegation interpretation, however, muddles this
149

See Martinez v. Martinez, 2008 WL 5262793, at *5-6.
18 U.S.C. §2265(e).
151
To engage the VAWA full faith and credit mandate to ensure enforceability
outside of Indian country, the issuing tribe must have subject matter jurisdiction,
jurisdiction over the defendant, and provide due process. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(b).
150
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phrase meaningless by purporting to delegate authority that a tribe
must necessarily already possess.
Fourth, the reference to a tribe’s power to exclude strongly
indicates an affirmation of inherent tribal powers. The power to
exclude has long been held to persist among the surviving bundle of
inherent tribal rights.152 It is considered an integral tribal power
pursuant to both a tribe’s status as a sovereign and a landowner.153 It
has been applied to any person within tribal lands, including members,
nonmembers, and non-Indians.154 Like the federal trust responsibility,
the power to exclude and its uniquely elevated status derives from
numerous treaty provisions specifically providing for the exclusion
right.155 In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, decided one year after
Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court found the tribal jurisdiction to tax
nonmembers on tribally-owned land derived from the tribe’s power as
landowner to exclude nonmembers, and from its “general authority, as
sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction.”156
While Montana made tribal land ownership only a persuasive factor
for regulating nonmembers, the power to exclude has proven to be
distinct and lasting.157 In Cooley, the Court reiterated these distinct
prongs of tribal sovereignty, noting that in addition to their inherent
sovereign powers based on the right to protect the health and welfare
of the tribe, tribes have a distinct right to exclude.158
In finding that the Duro-fix was a congressional affirmation of
inherent tribal powers, United States v. Lara noted the Duro-fix was
not just a congressionally permissible action, but that it was similarly
rooted in core tribal powers. “It concerns a tribe's authority to control
152

U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS 467 (Oct. 25, 1934) (“Over tribal
lands, the tribe has the rights of landowner as well as the rights of a local government,
dominions as well as sovereignty.”).
153
Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Legal
Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV. 85, 107-108 (2007).
154
Id. at 108.
155
See id. at 108-110.
156
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 130 (1982).
157
See, e.g. Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802
(9th Cir. 2011) (holding the regulatory power derived from the inherent power to
exclude is independent from the inherent powers recognized in Montana, 450 U.S.
544.); see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 691 n.11 (1993) (noting that
“[r]egulatory authority goes hand in hand with the power to exclude.”); Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 423–424 (1989)
(noting because the Yakima Nation lost the power to exclude, they similarly lost the
derived zoning authority over that closed area of the reservation).
158
Cooley, 593 U.S., slip op at 6.
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events that occur upon the tribe's own land.”159 Lara noted that the
Duro-fix was permissible in part because it revives powers that are in
close relation to other inherent tribal powers. Like criminal jurisdiction
over nonmembers, the issuance and enforcement of protection orders
over nonmembers derives from the core of tribal sovereignty.
Protection orders can range in form, including requiring a person to
stay a certain distance from another person or place. Only in their most
extreme versions do protection orders limit a person’s movement from
an entire jurisdiction, which draws upon the tribe’s inherent power to
exclude. The power to issue civil protection orders involving all
persons is necessarily included within the power to exclude. In
explicitly referencing this power in § 2265(e), Congress connected the
power to issue protection orders to the core of inherent tribal powers,
affirming both inherent powers.
Cumulatively, the array of plain language in VAWA 2013’s
modifications to § 2265(e) show an overarching push for tribal
inherent authority. Congress confirmed that tribal civil powers
regarding protection orders extend to the power to issue, to all persons,
to all of Indian country, and to all other matters over which tribes have
authority, are rooted in comparable inherent powers like the power to
exclude. It is a comprehensive approach to protection orders, mirroring
the same type of authority that exists in other jurisdictions. The plain
language of VAWA 2013’s § 2265(e) is an extension of VAWA
2000—both of which promote the inherent sovereignty of tribes to
respond to the needs of their communities.
Unlike the Duro-fix,160 Section 905 of VAWA 2013 lacks
explicit language that the verification is intended to be an affirmation,
but silence is not fatal here. In fact, Congress communicated that intent
through numerous VAWA language clarifications, resolving not just
Martinez, but providing a partial Montana-fix, too. Moreover, the
framing of those language clarifications, coupled with the reference to
a tribe’s inherent right to exclude, is rooted in inherent jurisdiction.
The plain language of § 2265(e) suggests a congressional intent to
affirm inherent tribal jurisdiction.
C. Internal Statutory Consistency: 18 U.S.C. § 2265

159

Lara, 541 U.S. at 204.
Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892, Sec. 8077 (Nov. 5, 1990) (while buried in
Department of Defense appropriations, the Duro-fix provides that tribal powers of
self-government “means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and
affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”) (emphasis added).
160

AFFIRMED OR DELEGATED?

TRIBAL LAW JOURNAL

33

Vol. 21

Section 2265(e) is a subpart of § 2265, regarding the full faith
and credit that is to be given protection orders. Section 2265(a)
requires states, tribes, and territories to provide full faith and credit to
each other’s protection orders, but only when the protection order
meets the requirements of § 2265(b). Section 2265(b) requires the
issuing court to have jurisdiction over the parties and the matter under
the relevant laws. The issuing court must also provide the respondent
due process rights to reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.
The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction puts § 2265(e)
at the crux of whether a tribal civil protection order will be entitled to
full faith and credit because tribal jurisdiction over both the parties and
the subject matter are required. By using the words “tribes shall have
full civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce protection orders involving
any person,”161 Congress cemented a tribe’s civil authority to issue and
enforce tribal protection orders for all other jurisdictions, relevant to
the other parts of § 2265. Just as Congress does not delegate federal
authority to states or territories regarding their capacity to issue civil
protection orders, § 2265(e) does not delegate federal authority so
much as it clarifies that tribes shall be treated on a par with states and
territories for purposes of full faith and credit.
D. Internal Legislative Consistency: Title IX of VAWA 2013
Assuming the plain language of § 2265 is ambiguous as to the
origins of the verified tribal powers, statutory interpretation leads us
next to the legislative context in which these provisions were enacted.
VAWA was originally enacted in 1994 and was designed to address
domestic and sexual violence. It emphasized a coordinated community
response to violence against women: it provided for restitution, civil
redress, established the Office on Violence Against Women, provided

161

18 U.S.C. §2265(e).
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grant dollars, and extended protections to vulnerable populations.162 It
was reauthorized in 2000,163 2005,164 and 2013.165
Section 905 is one component of Title IX within VAWA 2013.
Title IX is entirely devoted to safety for Indian women166 with a stated
policy to “develop and promote legislation and policies that enhance
best practices for responding to violent crimes against Indian
women.”167 It included strategies to enhance tribal capacities as well
as federal responses. Section 901 authorizes grants to Indian tribal
governments.168 Section 903 reauthorized the requirement for the
federal government to engage in consultation with tribes and actively
coordinate between the Departments of Justice, Health and Human
Services, and the Interior.169 Section 906 specifically regards federal
powers, and includes amendments to the federal assault statutes,
providing expanded federal authority to prosecute crimes like
strangling.170 Notably, tribal authority to issue civil protection orders
is not located in this federal powers section.
Instead, while section 905 regarding the power to issue civil
protection orders is in its own stand-alone section, it immediately
follows section 904, which similarly provides an implicit divestiture
“fix.” Section 904 recognizes the Special Domestic Violence Criminal
Jurisdiction (SDVCJ) of tribes, providing a partial Oliphant-fix for
participating tribes171 to criminally prosecute non-Indians for dating
violence, domestic violence, and violations of protection orders.172 In
describing the nature of this criminal jurisdiction, Congress mirrored
the language of the Duro-fix:

162

See generally Violence Against Women Act, Title IV, §§ 40001-40703 of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103rd Cong.,
Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994).
163
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, VAWA 2000, H.R.
3244, Division B, 106th Cong.
164
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong.
165
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong.
166
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127
Stat. 54, Title IX.
167
Id., § 901(10).
168
Id.
169
Id., § 903.
170
Id., § 906.
171
Because tribes can opt into special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the
statute refers to tribes that opt-in as “participating tribes.”
172
Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54, Title IX, § 904 (2013) (codified as 25 U.S.C.
§ 1304).
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“[T]he powers of self-government of a participating
tribe include the inherent power of that tribe, which is
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all
persons.”173
As a partial Oliphant-fix, and exactly like the Duro-fix, SDVCJ is an
explicit congressional relaxation of a prior Supreme Court decision,
implicitly divesting tribal criminal jurisdiction. The reasoning of Lara,
upholding the Duro-fix as a constitutionally valid affirmation of
inherent tribal powers, likely extends to SDVCJ.
Of course, Congress’s use of the inherent-recognized-affirmed
language for SDVCJ in section 904, and the absence of that language
in the immediately following section 905 regarding the civil power to
issue and enforce protection orders, could suggest congressional intent
to approach these powers differently. But finding section 905 to be a
delegation would mean Congress delegated a federal power for a tribe
to civilly issue and enforce a protection order, but affirmed the tribe’s
inherent power to prosecute the violation of that protection order. This
would have curious policy and practical implications. There are no
other indications in Title IX to support this curious inherent-delegated
combination, why Congress would affirm the arguably more intrusive
inherent criminal power, but delegate a civil one, or how this
combination would practically be implemented. Instead, section 905
of VAWA is not an intentional deviation from section 904’s
affirmation of inherent powers, it is simply a separate civil section.
Meanwhile, section 904’s SDVCJ is the only explicit statutory
expression of the origin of tribal powers in VAWA 2013, and it affirms
those powers as inherent.
E. Legislative History of § 2265(e)
The Senate Indian Affairs Committee report accompanying
Senate Bill 1763 (an early version of what would become § 2265(e))
noted that § 2265 is explicitly designed to reverse the Martinez case.174
The report noted the provision is intended to “clarif[y] that every Tribe
has full civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce certain protection orders
against Indians and non-Indians.”175 Similarly, the Senate Judiciary
Committee report noted the legislation was designed to correct the
173
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Martinez error.176 Further, the Senate report stated that Congress’s
intent was “to recognize that tribal courts have [this] civil
jurisdiction”.177 The legislative history, while minimal, uses words like
“recognize” and “affirm,” with no indication of a congressional intent
to delegate federal powers to tribes or inject federal case law into tribal
courts. The term “recognition” strongly supports an authority rooted in
inherent tribal powers.
A bill authored by Senators Hutchison and Grassley introduced
an alternative to what ultimately became VAWA 2013’s Title IX.178 It
provided for a federal cause of action allowing Indian tribes to petition
a federal court for a protection order to exclude any person from the
tribe’s Indian country for certain limited circumstances.179 Violations
of the protection order would be subject to federal penalties. This
version of the bill failed. Senators Hutchinson and Grassley’s
amendment provides some insight into the delegation-affirmation
question. Their proposed federal cause of action would have required
the tribe itself, not the victim, to request a protection order from the
federal government to exclude a perpetrator from tribal lands. This
structure would likely have caused incredible hardship for victims
seeking timely protection. It would have forced tribes to first
adjudicate the issuance of protection orders within their own systems,
and then go to federal court to essentially “register” each protection
order. This would have essentially undone the intent of § 2265’s full
faith and credit provisions. Such an amendment, as ill-conceived as it
might be, suggests that even Senators Hutchison and Grassley
conceived of § 2265(e) as enhancing inherent tribal powers: if
§ 2265(e) was a federal delegation, Senators Hutchison and Grassley
would likely have proposed further limitations on that delegation, or
proposed a federal cause of action to challenge tribal civil protection
violations in federal court. Instead, their failed proposal reads like an
attempt to circumvent inherent tribal powers.
The legislative history positions § 2265(e) as intended to “fix”
Martinez, much like how the Duro-fix and the partial Oliphant-fix in
section 904 of VAWA 2013 each remedied restrictions on inherent
tribal powers. The Senate described its intent to help tribes better
protect victims, noting tribal courts are “often in the best position to
best meet the needs of the residents of the community.”180 This pro176
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tribal self-determination stance, reiterated throughout the Senate
report, pushes toward an interpretation that § 2265(e) is an affirmation
of inherent sovereignty.
F. Federal Policy to Protect Native Women and Promote
Tribal Self-Determination
Congress has consistently recognized and affirmed the federal
trust responsibilities to tribes in matters involving violence against
Native women.181 In VAWA’s congressional findings, Congress
found: (1) One out of every 3 Indian (including Alaska Native) women
are raped in their lifetimes; (2) Indian women experience seven sexual
assaults per 1,000, compared with four per 1,000 among Black
Americans, three per 1,000 among Caucasians, two per 1,000 among
Hispanic women, and one per 1,000 among Asian women; (3) Indian
women experience the violent crime of battering at a rate of 23.2 per
1,000, compared with eight per 1,000 among Caucasian women;
(4) Between 1979 and 1992, homicide was the third leading cause of
death of Indian females aged fifteen, and 75 percent were killed by
family members or acquaintances; (5) Indian tribes require additional
criminal justice and victim services resources to respond to violent
assaults against women; and (6) The unique legal relationship of the
United States to Indian tribes creates a federal trust responsibility to
assist tribal governments in safeguarding the lives of Indian women.182
Since 1978, when Oliphant restricted tribal authority to
criminally prosecute non-Indian offenders, tribal communities have
experienced a compounding violence epidemic, including drastic
gender-based violence. Many of Congress’s VAWA 2013 findings
have been reinforced by subsequent studies showing that the crisis
continues today.183 Pursuant to the Tribal Law and Order Act,184 and
after surveying Indian country, the very first recommendation of the
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Indian Law and Order Commission’s (“ILOC”) 2013 report was not to
delegate federal powers to tribes, but rather that tribes should have full
territorial inherent jurisdiction.185 The partial Oliphant-fix/ILOC
response regarding special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction is
emblematic of the self-determination era.186
It is fitting that the dire needs of victims of gender-based
violence in Indian country are producing the first congressional
responses to the implicit divestiture crisis. Section 2265(e) is not a
random federal delegation outlier, but part of a comprehensive
congressional response, empowering tribes by relaxing federal
restraints on their inherent sovereignty. Congress could have been
more skillful in describing the origins of tribal civil power to issue and
enforce protection orders, but nevertheless, Congress’s intent is clear
enough: tribes have the inherent power to protect victims.
G. International Push Toward Tribal Self-Determination
In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples following decades of
advocacy by Indigenous peoples. The Declaration is a standard-setting
document supported by 150 nation states (including the United States),
and is committed to the individual and collective rights of Indigenous
peoples, which have for so long been disregarded in legal systems
around the world. The Declaration recognizes that Indigenous peoples
have rights to self-determination, equality, property, culture, health,
and economic well-being, among many others. It calls on nation states
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to undertake legal reforms to remedy past violations and ensure current
protections for Indigenous peoples’ rights.187
Most fundamental among the Declaration’s provisions are its
recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights of self-determination.188 It
claims “Indigenous peoples . . . have the right to autonomy or selfgovernment in matters relating to their internal and local affairs”189 and
“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their
distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions,
while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.”190 Particularly
in light of federal case law diminishing tribal self-determination
through implicit divestiture, the Declaration offers a powerful
affirmation of the inherent rights of Indigenous peoples to their laws
and their basic right to survive as distinct peoples, which necessarily
includes the right to respond to the threatened safety of residents.
The Declaration also identifies the specific impact that genderbased violence has wreaked on Indigenous peoples. Article 22 notes
that nation states should “take measures, in conjunction with
Indigenous peoples, to ensure that Indigenous women and children
enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of violence
and discrimination.”191 The crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous
women, girls, and Two-Spirit persons, is the result of the violent
intersection of nation state indifference and tribal paralysis.192
Responding to the crisis necessarily requires reenabling tribes to
respond.
Section 2265(e) is a limited implementation of the principles
of the Declaration. It enables tribes to offer victims an accessible
forum for relief. It enables tribes to respond, including by participating
in the coordinated inter-jurisdictional response among other tribes,
states, and the federal government. And, critically, it recognizes that
tribes have always possessed this power and must exercise it for both
the public safety and for tribal nation-building.
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Conclusion

Despite inadvertent references to delegations of federal power
in Spurr v. Pope, Section 2265(e) is a congressional affirmation of
inherent tribal powers. It is a Martinez-fix and a partial Montana-fix.
This affirmation is demonstrated by the plain language of § 2265(e);
by the interaction of § 2265(e) with the rest of § 2265; by its position
within Title IX of VAWA 2013 and its close relationship to special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction; in the legislative history of §
2265(e), including the failed attempts to undermine § 2265(e); and in
the larger national and international policies promoting tribal selfdetermination and meaningful responses to gender-based violence.
Tribes are distinct sovereign governments, with both the right
and the obligation to protect their communities. Tribal sovereignty
should not be tampered with or diminished by the whim of courts eager
to implicitly divest inherent tribal jurisdiction. Rather, pursuant to the
federal government’s trust obligations toward tribes, and in the face of
a human rights crisis resulting in unprecedented gender-based
violence, the least Congress can do is to remedy bungled implicit
divestiture case law. Enacting such remedy is what Congress has done
through § 2265(e). Section 2265(e), like special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction, is an affirmation of inherent tribal sovereignty.
Its provisions are already enabling tribes to provide protective services
as a component of a holistic bundle of support to continue the healing
process after centuries of violence. Civil protection orders are only a
small step towards remedying the full damage wrought by implicit
divestiture; however, by ensuring that protection orders are held to be
expressions of inherent tribal power—rather than delegated federal
power—will promote current tribal efforts and ready those efforts for
future solutions to implicit divestiture.
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